Heterogeneous MPSoCs for Mixed Criticality Systems: Challenges and
  Opportunities by Hassan, Mohamed
1Heterogeneous MPSoCs for Mixed Criticality
Systems: Challenges and Opportunities
Mohamed Hassan Member, IEEE
mohamed.hassan@ieee.org
Intel Corp.
F
Abstract—Due to their cost, performance, area, and energy efficiency,
MPSoCs offer appealing architecture for emerging mixed criticality sys-
tems (MCS) such as driverless cars, smart power grids, and healthcare
devices. Furthermore, heterogeneity of MPSoCs presents exceptional
opportunities to satisfy the conflicting requirements of MCS. Seizing
these opportunities is unattainable without addressing the associated
challenges. We focus on four aspects of MCS that we believe are of most
importance upon adopting MPSoCs: theoretical model, interference,
data sharing, and security. We outline existing solutions, highlight the
necessary considerations for MPSoCs including both opportunities they
create and research directions yet to be explored.
1 INTRODUCTION
R eal-time systems are those systems, whose proper behaviourdepends not only on their functionality but also on their re-
sponse time. Until recently, real-time systems have been limited to
safety-critical domains such as avionics and spacecrafts. However,
with the emanating Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and Internet of
Things (IoT) revolution, real-time systems are becoming ubiqui-
tous in many emerging domains. Examples include transportation
such as smart vehicles, infrastructures such as power grids, health-
care such as implantable devices, and industrial environment such
as robots. These domains pose two new major aspects that did not
traditionally exist in real-time systems: the mixed criticality nature
of its software applications, and the Multiple-Processor System-
on-Chip (MPSoC) architecture of its hardware components.
1) Mixed Criticality Systems (MCSs). These domains are
no longer solely hosting isolated safety-critical tasks. Instead,
they execute various tasks with different criticalites, where the
criticality of a task is determined based on the consequences
of the failure to meet its requirements. For instance, Figure 1
illustrates a subset of the tasks embedded on a modern vehicle.
Tasks such as the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS), the steering,
and the engine control units are of high-criticality. Meeting the
timing requirements of those tasks (historically known as Hard-
Real Time (HRT) tasks) is a life-safety condition. Other tasks
such as the infotainment system and the connectivity box (such as
internet, radio, WiFi,..etc.) are of low criticality in the sense that
they do not require strict timing guarantees. Instead, their proper
functionality requires a high average-case performance. A third
class of tasks contains tasks with medium criticality, known as
Soft-Real Time (SRT) tasks, such as the navigation system and
the instrument cluster in a vehicle. They require a predictable
execution time, which is not as strict as higher-critical tasks, as
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Fig. 1: Examples of tasks running on a modern vehicle.
well as a reasonable average-case performance. The number of
criticality levels is domain specific and is not limited to three.
For instance, the DO-178C avionics standard defines five levels
of assurance, while the ISO-26262 defines four automotive safety
integrity levels.
2) MPSoCs. MPSoCs are appealing platforms for emerging
MCS domains primarily due to the benefits they provide in cost,
area, power-consumption, and performance compared to tradi-
tional computing systems. In addition, heterogeneous MPSoCs
allow for customized solutions to increase these benefits. The main
intuition is that designing a single Processing Element (PE) to
meet conflicting requirements of MCS tasks is inefficient due to
the limited cost, area, and battery budgets of MCS. Contrarily,
designing custom PEs towards meeting those requirements has
already proved its efficaciousness in current SoCs. Examples
include specialized Digital Signal Processors (DSPs), cipher, and
multimedia PEs. In fact, one of the early motives of evolving
MPSoCs was the real-time, low area, and low-power demands
from embedded systems [1]. The envision for MCS is that a task
with a particular criticality can be scheduled in an expedient core
with the appropriate level of hardware predictability. Figure 2 de-
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Fig. 2: Examples of tasks running on a modern vehicle.
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lineates an example of such heterogeneous MPSoC architecture. In
the near future, MPSoCs are expected to be used in all embedded
systems domains [2], [3]. To make this a reality, researchers made
sincere efforts to provide MPSoCs tailored for safety-critical tasks
(e.g. [2]–[4]). Companies started to develop MPSoCs that include
dictated real-time processing units such as the Zynq UltraScale+
MPSoC [5] from Xilinx, and the heterogeneous Nona-Core SoC
from Renesas [6]. Safety standards are also slowly shifting towards
considering multiple PEs. For instance, the AUTOSAR standard
from the automotive industry released a guide to deploy software
tasks onto multi-core architectures in a recent revision [7].
These two aspects together (MCS and MPSoCs) of emerging
embedded systems bring out a number of challenges that has to
be carefully repelled. The focus of this paper is to highlight those
challenges, the proposed solutions in literature to address them,
and the open issues yet to be addressed. We limit our discussion
to four aspects of MCS: theoretical modelling, timing interference,
data sharing, and security.
2 MCS MODEL
Current Model. As identified by Vestal in his constitutional
paper [8], the MCS model differs from the traditional real-time
task model because of the uncertainty in considered WCET.
Basically, the computed WCET of a task is an estimate calcu-
lated using extensive experimental testing and/or static analysis
methods. Hence, based on the accuracy and pessimism levels
of these methods, different estimates may exist (Figure 3). The
higher the criticality of a task is, the more pessimistic its WCET
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Fig. 4: Current MCS Model and its issues.
estimates are. This observation resulted in representing the WCET
as a function in the criticality level, C(l). The majority of MCS
papers consider a model of only two CLs, LO and HI [9]. Each
task has C(LO) and C(HI), where C(LO) ≤ C(HI). The
system operates initially in a normal mode, where it considers
the C(LO) of each task and both higher- and lower-critical tasks
utilize the hardware resources. Run-time techniques are used to
monitor execution times of running tasks. If a critical task exceeds
its C(LO), the system switches to a degraded mode, where it
suspends all lower-critical tasks and considers the C(HI) of
the higher-critical ones. This dynamic migration between various
modes is a key characteristic of MCS as compared to single-
criticality systems.
2.1 Issues with the Current Model.
There exist number of issues with approaches adopting this simpli-
fied widely-considered model. Figure 4 highlights the three issues
we believe are of most importance in MPSoCs.
1) Suspension. Upon switching to the degraded mode, no
guarantees are given to lower-critical tasks. The dual-criticality
model deems lower-critical as non-critical; hence, there are no
consequences of suspending them. Nevertheless, in systems with
multiple CLs such as in the ISO-26262 standard, which has four
ASILs A (lowest) to D (highest), suspension of tasks of ASIL
A may be acceptable, while suspension of tasks of ASIL C
may be prohibitively unacceptable solution as it may result in
safety issues [10]. Different approaches than suspension has to
be considered. The approach in [11] changes the model such
that C(HI) ≤ C(LO) for lower-critical tasks. Accordingly,
upon switching to the degraded mode, instead of abandoning
them, their guarantees are only degraded. Another approach is
followed by [12], where instead of directly switching the mode and
suspending lower-critical tasks, the memory service guarantees of
3those tasks are degraded to reduce the interference on the higher-
critical to accommodate for the increase in the execution time.
These approaches consider a system-wide mode switch, where all
the system components and tasks migrate to the new mode.
MPSoC Reconsiderations. In an MPSoC, there may be
no need to deploy such full-system mode migration. Assume a
scenario where a task, τi running on the medium-criticality (SRT)
core in Figure 2 such that it exceeds its depicted C for the
current mode, say because of a soft fault or a temperature increase
in the SRT core. There exist opportunities to keep other non-
interfering cores running the same set of tasks (i.e. no effective
mode switching), while switching only the necessary core(s).
Other technique can be migrating tasks to ”more-predictable”
cores to avoid more switching at all. For the exemplified scenario,
tasks running on that particular SRT-core can be migrated to an
HRT-core (if possible) upon the monitored increase in τi’s C . So,
a set of run-time decisions now exist thanks to the heterogeneity
nature of MPSoCs. Such MPSoC-related opportunities are yet to
be explored.
2) Number of CLs and Sources of Uncertainty. Restricting
the model to only two criticalities is not sufficient to meet industry
standards, which define up to five levels as aforestated. It may
seem that extending approaches that consider this model to more
than two criticalities is straightforward. However, in most cases
it is not. For instance, the suspension issue discussed in the first
point is an outcome of a dual-criticality model, in which lower-
critical tasks are deemed non-critical. For systems with multiple
levels, different approaches than suspension have to be considered.
MPSoC Reconsiderations. The heterogeneous nature of MP-
SoCs has a direct effect on the number of CLs. The standard
model assumes that the uncertainty in WCET does not come from
the system itself; rather, it comes from our inability to measure
(or compute) it with complete confidence [9]. Although the later
part of this assumption still holds for MPSoCs, the former does
not. Yes, the WCET estimate in MPSoCs is still a function of
our confidence-level of the used tools. However, we argue that
the architecture of MPSoCs originates uncertainties as well. In
traditional single-core or Symmetric Multiple-Processor (SMP)
architectures, which core (or cores) is executing a task does not
affect its measured execution time. However, in a heterogeneous
MPSoC (such as in Figure 2), the decision of which cores are used
to execute a task directly affects the level of certainty in its WCET.
For instance, an HRT core is usually simple in terms of micro-
architecture with almost no implemented architectural optimiza-
tions. This is necessary to allow for high-level of analysability,
which leads to tight WCETs for safety-critical tasks. Contrarily, a
high-performance core usually deploys speculative optimizations
such as out-of-order execution and branch prediction. As a result,
the confidence level in a task’s WCET when it runs on an HRT
core definitely differs from the case when the same task runs
on a high-performance core. The interdependency dilemma that
requires investigation here is that the WCET estimates become
a function in the task-to-core mapping, which is part of the
scheduling algorithm that relies on these estimates as inputs.
3) Overheads. Monitoring tasks and switching between run-
ning modes engross high overheads. However, to simplify the
scheduling problem of MCS, most approaches ignore these over-
heads. Although this may be a theoretically acceptable assump-
tion since these overheads are implementation-related, a practical
adoption of these approaches in industry mandates careful quan-
tification of these overheads. Recently, a few efforts have been
proposed to bridge this gap [13], [14]. While the former [13]
focuses on single-core, the latter [14] evaluates multi-core plat-
forms. Both efforts consider the implementation of a subset of
proposed scheduling mechanisms; thus, more studies are required
to identify implementation-related issues of theory-based novel
MCS scheduling techniques.
MPSoC Reconsiderations. Deployment of MCS onto MP-
SoCs requires addressing the scalability challenges associated
with these scheduling and monitoring techniques. Further, mode
switching in MPSoCs may incur task migrations or reassignment
of heterogeneous cores to tasks; thus, the effects of these deci-
sions on the switching overhead need to be quantified. On the
other hand, MPSoCs open the door for customized solutions. For
instance, dedicating a PE for the run-time monitoring possibly
helps in faster detection of exceptional events, therefore enabling
the system to react in a timely manner. The architecture of this PE
can be further tailored to optimize the behaviour of the monitoring
techniques. Specialized PEs are widely used by current MPSoCs,
which usually dictate PEs for security, connectivity, data signal
processing, and other tasks.
3 SHARED RESOURCES: TIMING INTERFERENCE
In MPSoCs, different PEs in the system interfere with each other,
while competing to access memory resources that are shared
amongst them. As Figure 2 depicts, these shared resources include
interconnects, on-chip caches, and off-chip Dynamic Random
Access Memories (DRAMs). This interference is a challenge
for real-time systems because operations of one core affect the
temporal behaviour of other cores, which complicates the timing
analysis of the system.
Since the aforementioned MCS model originally evolved for
single-core systems, most of proposed approaches adopting it
do not incorporate these interferences in their scheduling or
analysis [15]. Experiments show that memory interferences can
contribute up to 300% to the WCET [16], while the memory
bus interference can solely increase the WCET up to 44% [17].
Consequently, it is of unavoidable necessity to account for these
interferences for MPSoC MCS. There exist proposals to address
this interference in multi-core MCS at the interconnect (e.g. [12],
[15]), the shared cache (e.g. [18], [19]), and the shared DRAM
(e.g. [20]–[22]). However, most of these approaches consider SMP
architectures and do not account for the heterogeneity of MPSoCs.
MPSoC Reconsiderations. Bounding the timing interference
in MPSoCs is a burdensome goal for many reasons.
1) The interference exaggerates with the increase in number of
PEs competing on the shared resources.
2) Each type of PEs has its own memory access behaviour,
which complicates the analysis, thus leading to more pes-
simism. For instance, data-intensive PEs such as multimedia
and DSP processors can saturate system queues by their
memory requests if not carefully arbitrated. Thus, unlike most
of the current approaches, a requirement- and a criticality-
aware arbitration is a must to deliver differential service to
PEs.
3) Understanding the architectural details of shared resources
(such as the interconnect and the memory hierarchy) is
inevitable to derive realistic bounds.
On the other hand, MPSoCs provide unique opportunities that
do not exist in SMPs. Efforts to investigate these opportunities
4will facilitate the deployment of MCS onto MPSoCs. Examples of
research directions include:
1) Which memory levels should be shared amongst which cores
to meet various requirements of MCS. For instance, Does the
GPU share the last-level cache with the GPU?
2) How to distribute the cache architecture? Would implement-
ing a Non-Uniform Cache Architecture (NUCA), which is
a norm in many-core systems, be an adequate approach for
MCS (e.g. helping in achieving different levels of isolation)?
3) Usually, MPSoCs integrate different types of on-chip memo-
ries such as hardware-managed caches and software-managed
Scratch-Pad Memories (SPMs). Most of the currently avail-
able approaches focus on a single type. Similarly, MPSoCs
support different types of available off-chip memories such
as Double Data Rate (DDR), Graphics DDR (GDDR), Low-
Power DDR (LPDDR). Investigating the co-operation of
these types is also worth investigating.
4 SHARED RESOURCES: SHARED DATA
One of the most challenging burdens for computer architects is to
maintain correctness of shared data stored in memory hierarchies
of multiple-PEs platforms, which is known as cache coherence.
Although cache coherence has been extensively investigated for
conventional performance-oriented platforms, embedded systems
introduce new challenges from the predictability perspective. For
instance, empirical studies show that the data interference and the
coherence effects can make the parallel execution of an application
3.87× slower than its sequential execution [23], while the worst-
case coherence latency exhibits quadratic growth with increasing
number of PEs [24]. Real-time community has introduced vari-
ous solutions to address this problem, which we categorize into
three approaches identifying the applicability of each approach to
MPSoCs.
1) Prevention. This approach avoids the problems resulting
from data sharing by completely disallowing it through enforcing
complete isolation between tasks. At the shared cache, mecha-
nisms such as strict cache partitioning and colouring are used [25].
At the DRAM level, bank privatization is utilized to uniquely map
tasks to different banks [20]. Isolation is an attractive solution
as it simplifies the analysis and minimizes timing interference,
while ensuring data correctness. However, data isolation suffers
from three limitations. 1) It adopts the independent-task model,
thus disabling any communication amongst tasks. 2) It may result
in a poor memory or cache utilization. For instance, a task can
keep evicting its cache lines if it reaches the maximum of its
partition size, while other partitions may remain underutilized. 3)
It does not scale with increasing number of cores. For example,
the number of cores in the system has to be less than or equal
to the number of DRAM banks to be able to achieve isolation at
DRAM.
MPSoC Reconsiderations. It might be acceptable for tradi-
tional real-time task models to assume isolation in order to achieve
uniprocessor-equivalence [26] in multiprocessor platforms, thus
allowing the reuse of maturely developed scheduling approaches
for uniprocessors. However, with the emerging technologies that
continuously adopt new functionalities, complete isolation seems
to be a prohibitively costly solution. Considering the automotive
applications in Figure 1, they utilize data collected by various
sensors to conduct the appropriate act. This data is usually shared
and used by applications with different-criticalities. For instance,
the brake sensors are utilized by both the high-critical ABS, and
the driver assistance and cruise control tasks which are of medium-
criticality [27]. In addition, with the massive concurrency of
MPSoCs, solutions preventing simultaneous running of dependent
(i.e. data sharing) tasks are becoming evidently ill-suited as they
diminish the performance gains of MPSoCs due to the aforemen-
tioned three limitations. Accordingly, researchers recognized that
in order to have any practical impact, scheduling techniques must
permit data sharing [24], [28] and the following two approaches
are recently proposed to solve data sharing problems without
enforcing isolation.
2) Shared-data aware scheduler. This approach combines
operating system techniques, profiling, and hardware performance
counters to envision the effects of data sharing. Accordingly, the
scheduler is constructed such that it minimizes those effects [23],
[28]. For example, if two tasks share data, a simple solution is
to schedule them such that they do not simultaneously run on
different PEs. This can be achieved either by postponing the
execution of one of them, or mapping them to the same PE [28].
MPSoC Reconsiderations. These scheduling-based solutions
are promising since they address the shared data problem, while
not enforcing isolation. However, some of these solutions have
limited applicability to MPSoCs. For example, given the high
level of parallelism in MPSoCs, mapping dependent tasks to same
core may not be a viable solution as it limits performance gains.
Similarly, collecting run-time readings from performance counters
may not be costly effective in terms of overheads given the large
number and heterogeneity of PEs in MPSoCs.
3) Predictable hardware cache coherence. A recent
work [24] manages shared data in real-time systems through
deploying a hardware cache coherence protocol. Identifying the
sources of unpredictability due to coherence interference, this
work promotes certain invariants to maintain towards allowing
simultaneous and predictable accesses to shared data. These in-
variants are satisfied by augmenting the classic Modify-Share-
Invalidate (MSI) protocol with transient coherence states, and
minimal architectural changes. The advantages of this approach
is that programmers do not need to explicitly manage coherence
of shared data in the application. In addition, it does not require
any modifications to existing scheduling algorithms.
MPSoC Reconsiderations. This approach does not address
coherence in MCS. In addition, this approach, along with all the
discussed approaches, consider SMPs. Effects of heterogeneity
on these approaches is not investigated yet. For example, how
coherence operates across different types of PEs? One coherence
protocol might not fit all types and allowing for different coher-
ence protocols can be a better solution for MCS if the interaction
between these protocols is carefully designed.
5 SECURITY OF MPSOC MCS
Security is one of the biggest challenges encountering researchers
and engineers of CPS. The more ubiquitous the CPS become, the
more concerning their security is. To exemplify, various vulnera-
bilities have been reported in industrial SCADA systems [29] and
smart vehicles [30], [31].
MPSoC Reconsiderations. Three aspects make the develop-
ment of secure MPSoC MCS a burden challenge.
1) The Cyber-physical nature of MCS. MCS in many emerging
domains interact with the physical world, which makes them
CPS. Embedded components in these CPS manage sensitive
5TABLE 1: Opprotunities and Challenges.
Aspect Challenges Opportunities/Research directions
Theoretical Model
1. WCET becomes a function of task-to-core mapping 1. Spatial/partial instead of system-wide mode switching
2. Scalability of monitoring techniques and switching
overheads
2. Alternatives to mode switch such as migrating tasks to more-
predictable cores
3. Effects of heterogeneity on task migration upon switch-
ing
3. Customizable solutions: e.g. dedicating specialised PE for execution-
time monitoring
Timing Interference
1. Large number of PEs 1. Which levels should be shared amongst which PEs for MCS?
2. PEs have different memory behaviors 2. Distribution of cache architecture. e.g, uniform or NUCA?
3. Hard to derive tight bounds 3. Different types of on- (caches and SPMs) and off-chip memories
(DDR, GDDR, LPDDR)
Data Sharing
1. massive parallelism deems isolation ill-suited 1. Different PEs have different transaction sizes and BW requirements
2. Different memory patterns complicates the analysis 2. Different memory types with different features (high bandwidth vs.
low latency)
3. Scheduling-based approaches are hard to adopt 3. Possibility for different approaches for each PE type
Security
1. CPS entails possible catastrophic threats 1. Identifying MPSoCs specific vulnerabilities
2. New heterogeneity-exploiting threats 2. Developing cost- and performance-effective methodologies to face
threats
3. New vulnerabilities because of Shared components
between different criticalities
3. Adopting security as a first-class citizen in designing MPSoCs for
MCS
tasks; therefore, any security breach could lead to catastrophic
consequences. These consequences range from revealing personal
information (e.g. from wearable devices) to a global threat (e.g.
compromising a nuclear plant). Consequently, ensuring the se-
curity of these systems is a first-class mission. In addition, the
interaction with the physical world allows for threats that did not
exist in traditional computing systems. For example, researchers
successfully managed to gain access to locked cars by only
eavesdropping a single signal from the original remote keyless
entry unit of the car [30].
2) The heterogeneity of MPSoCs. On one hand, each PE of MP-
SoC has different characteristics and can even be an intellectual
proprietary of a third-party entity. Accordingly, the security prob-
lems of each of these PEs are inherited. On the other hand, these
PEs share system components and interact with each other. This
opens the door for new across-PEs threats. Accordingly, threats
and vulnerabilities in MPSoCs are harder to analyse, detect, and
assess compared to traditional systems. To exemplify, the well-
known Stuxnet attack exploited the authentication of the Siemens
programmable logic controller to access a Windows machine [29].
3) The shared hardware components in MPSoCs. Historically,
security was not considered as a concern for MCS because
isolation was a design aspect of these systems, where each task
(or group of tasks with same criticality) is running on a PE (or
a partition of PEs) that is completely isolated from other PEs (or
partitions). As a consequence, sensitive tasks that require high
levels of security is isolated from non-secure tasks. However, in
MPSoCs, this is not the case. Different PEs, and hence tasks,
share hardware components and isolation is considered a costly
solution as previously explained. Again, this creates new potential
threats. To exemplify, researchers were able to control sensitive
(considered secure) ECUs such as the engine control in a Jeep
Cherokee car by compromising the (considered insecure) radio
unit because the radio unit shares the CAN network with these
ECUs [31]. To address these challenges, three research directions
are necessary towards secure deployment of MPSoC MCS: 1)
identifying new vulnerabilities of MPSoCs that did not exist in
traditional platforms, 2) developing cost- and performance- effec-
tive methodologies to prevent or mitigate them, and 3) adopting
security as a first-class citizen in designing MPSoCs for MCS
(secure-by design concept).
6 CONCLUSION
We argue that MPSoCs will be soon the dominating platform for
emerging embedded systems domains. Despite the tremendous
benefits and opportunities they provide, certain challenges have
to be addressed and new research directions need to be explored.
Four aspects are of great importance upon deploying MCS on
MPSoCs: theoretical modelling, timing interference, data sharing,
and security. For each of these aspects, Table 1 highlights both
the remarkable challenges and the opportunities that MPSoCs
uniquely create. These challenges and opportunities can be back
traced to three characteristics of MPSoCs: 1) large number of PEs,
2) heterogeneity of PEs, 3) different types of shared resources
amongst PEs. We believe that seizing these opportunities and
addressing associated challenges will enable enormous advances
for MCS applications.
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